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Executive Summary
The need to improve methods for managing 
drought risks in the low-rainfall areas of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA] has increased in 
recent decades as population growth and climate 
change have contributed to greater demands on 
the resource base and accentuated both the inci­
dence and severity of drought losses. Government 
interventions have typically been initiated on an ad 
hoc basis in response to crisis situations, and little 
thought is usually given to their long-term impacts 
on the way farmers and herders manage resources 
and the productivity of agropastoral systems. There 
is now accumulating evidence to show that once 
drought management interventions are institu­
tionalized, they lead to changes in how resources 
are managed, including the increased cropping and 
privatization of rangeland resources and more 
settled patterns of livestock production. These 
changes can contribute to greater productivity and 
improved livelihoods. If drought management 
interventions are subsidized, however, they can also 
lead to moral hazard problems whereby herders 
adopt excessively risky farm management practices, 
with increased losses in drought years and a grow­
ing dependence on government assistance. Drought 
management interventions need to be designed so 
that they assist farmers and herders to better 
manage risk and to improve their productivity and 
incomes, but without distorting incentives in inap­
propriate ways. The experience with feed subsidy 
and credit programs in the MENA region has had 
mixed results, and although they have helped pro­
tect incomes and food security in drought years, 
they have had negative impacts on the way 
resources are managed. Better alternatives could be 
area-based rainfall insurance, particularly if offered 
by the private sector; the development of more 
accurate and accessible drought forecasting infor­
mation; and a switch to safety nets that are tied to 
poverty criteria rather than agricultural outcomes.
Your assignment is to propose an appropriate mix 
of drought management policies for the MENA 
region, giving careful thought to the kinds of addi­
tional information needed to inform these choices.
Background
Drought has long been a significant factor in the 
Middle East and North Africa [MENA] region, 
particularly for the low-rainfall crop-livestock sys­
tems and for herders in the vast grazing areas of 
the steppe. Unfortunately, the level of wealth 
accumulated in these agropastoral societies is 
inadequate to provide full protection from severe 
droughts, and the economic and human losses in 
drought periods can be severe. The problem has 
worsened with population growth, as more and 
more people seek to earn a livelihood from the 
meager resources available in these areas. It may 
also have been aggravated by more frequent and 
prolonged droughts associated with global 
warming.
The high cost of droughts and the increasing vul­
nerability of agropastoral societies have led many 
governments in the region to intervene with vari­
ous forms of drought assistance. Many of these 
interventions, however, are encouraging farming 
practices that could increase both the extent of 
future drought losses and the dependence of local 
people on government assistance. They are also 
costly to governments and use resources that 
could otherwise be spent for development pur­
poses. A key question for this case study is 
whether drought relief programs can be designed 
better to achieve their immediate objectives, but 
without distorting economic incentives for more 
sustainable management of natural resources.
Funning and Resource Use in the MENA 
Region
About one-third of the MENA region's total 
population is rural and depends on agriculture for 
important shares of household income. Yet agricul­
tural land is extremely limited in the region. Arable 
land and permanent crops constitute only about 7 
percent of the total land area; 25 percent is classed 
as pasture (mainly in areas with under 200 milli­
meters [mm] of mean annual precipitation [m.a.p.]]; 
and 7 percent is forest and woodland (often in 
poor condition owing to grazing and fuel gather­
ing], The remaining 60 percent of the area is essen­
tially desert. The region has a Mediterranean 
climate with cool to cold winters and hot dry
summers. Most of the rainfall is in the winter, but 
it is highly erratic in space and time, making agri­
culture a risky business.
About three-quarters of the arable area is semi-arid 
with only 200-400  mm of m.a.p. The scope for 
crop diversification on rainfed land is limited in 
these areas. There is a sharp decline in the share of 
legumes, oilseeds, and vegetables and an increasing 
dominance of cereals—especially barley [grown 
mainly for animal feed]—as one moves from 
higher- to lower-rainfall areas. In the driest areas, 
barley is increasingly grown today in what were 
natural grazing areas.
Despite its small area, irrigated agriculture accounts 
for significant shares of total agricultural produc­
tion, value added, and employment. Problems of 
soil and water pollution from agricultural uses and 
urban and industrial wastes, overpumping of 
groundwater aquifers, accumulation of salts in the 
soil, and competition from other users are becom­
ing major constraints, however, and the prospects 
for expanding irrigated area are very limited.
Livestock are both a principal component of agri­
cultural incomes and the main source of family 
wealth in these low-rainfall and upland areas. Sheep 
and goats are most numerous on the low-rainfall 
rangelands of MENA. Cattle are more commonly 
maintained on farms or on grazing areas in higher- 
rainfall areas. Sheep numbers have increased by 
about 50 percent since 1961-1965, and cattle by 
about 5 percent.
Human population growth is high, currently 
around 3.3 percent a year for the MENA region as 
a whole, and although population is increasingly 
concentrated in urban areas, population density 
continues to increase in many low-rainfall areas. 
Poverty is also concentrated in these areas.
The Impact of Droughts
Although annual rainfall frequently falls below the 
mean, drought is associated with catastrophic rain­
fall shortages. Pratt et al. [1997] suggest that a 
drought can be said to occur in a year when rainfall 
falls below half the long-term average or when rain­
fall in two or more successive years is below 75 
percent of that average. Drought of this magnitude 
stunts pastures, desiccates water points, greatly 
reduces crop yield, and kills livestock. It can lead to 
the liquidation of a significant part of the total
flock in the absence of other sources of feed. 
Moreover, since the main commercial output of 
pastoral systems is meat, meat prices tend to be 
negatively correlated with drought [more animals 
are available for sale in drought years], and 
although this occurrence benefits urban consumers, 
it accentuates income shortfalls of producers. Pro­
ducers also suffer a knock-on effect when they try 
to restock after drought, since prices for live 
animal skyrocket. As human populations grow, so 
do animal stocking rates—the number of animals 
kept on a given land area. Thus, pastures are put 
under increasing stress, which in turn increases 
their vulnerability to drought. What used to be a 
manageable rainfall outcome may now be con­
sidered a serious drought that leads to significant 
economic and social costs.
How herders traditionally manage droughts. Agro­
pastoral societies have developed their own strate­
gies for coping with drought. These strategies 
include
• mobile or transhumant grazing practices 
that reduce the risk of having insufficient 
forage in any one location;
• reciprocal grazing arrangements with more 
distant communities for access to their 
resources in drought years;
• adjustment of flock sizes and stocking 
rates as the rainy reason unfolds, to best 
match available grazing resources;
• keeping extra animals that can be easily 
liquidated in a drought, either for food or 
cash;
• investment in water availability—wells, 
cisterns, and water harvesting;
• diversification into crops and livestock 
[agropastoralism], especially in proximity 
to settlements, and storage of surplus 
grain, straw, and forage as a reserve in 
good rainfall years;
• diversification among animal species
[sheep, goats, cattle, camels, donkeys] and 
different breeds within species; and
• income diversification into nonagricultural 
occupations, particularly seasonal migra­
tion for off-farm employment in urban 
areas.
These traditional risk management strategies have 
proved effective in managing drought and have 
enabled pastoral societies to survive for many cen­
turies. The interplay between drought and tradi­
tional management systems has also helped to keep 
total flock sizes in equilibrium with the inherent 
productivity of the pastures, avoiding the long­
term degradation of grazing areas. Stocking rates 
would trend upward between droughts as herders 
bred more animals and then would fall when the 
next drought occurred; fluctuations in herd size 
closely followed rainfall patterns; and peak stocking 
rates rarely reached unsustainable levels.
Despite their advantages, traditional drought man­
agement strategies can have associated opportunity 
costs. It is useful to think in terms of two types of 
such costs: those arising from inefficient use of 
resources within existing agropastoral systems, and 
opportunity costs arising from failure to exploit 
more productive agricultural development path­
ways.
Examples of the first type of opportunity cost are 
as follows: by liquidating animals during droughts, 
herders may end up with too few animals in the 
immediate post-drought period and hence miss out 
on important short-term production opportunities. 
On the other hand, given a sufficient respite 
between droughts, herders may build up excessive 
flock sizes in order to have a liquid asset as a hedge 
against the next drought. This practice can lead to 
overgrazing and the degradation of pasture, with 
reduced productivity. Herders also prefer to keep 
traditional breeds that are more drought tolerant 
but that might be less productive than exotics 
under more favorable management, and they are 
often reluctant to use or invest in modern inputs 
(such as feed and veterinary treatments] that could 
increase average profitability but that might lead to 
loss of capital investment if rainfall is unfavorable. 
There is a dearth of quantitative information about 
these costs.
The second type of opportunity cost is more 
speculative. If mobility and transhumant grazing 
practices remain the primary strategy for managing 
drought risk, then communities must retain large 
areas of land as common property and make 
reciprocal grazing arrangements with other com­
munities for use in drought years. This require­
ment necessarily restrains the enclosure and privati­
zation of land, which in turn can impede investment
in land improvements and the development of 
more intensive and settled farming systems in areas 
where rainfall, soils, and topography make settle­
ment a rational goal.
Without a shift to such intensification strategies, it 
is not dear how rural communities can continue to 
absorb increases in their populations. One alterna­
tive is more effective management of common 
property grazing areas by local communities, with 
collective investment in land improvements. But the 
absence of many successful examples in the region 
despite numerous donor-funded projects suggests 
that such local management is extremely difficult to 
organize, manage, and sustain, particularly in the 
context of rapid population growth, uncertain 
property rights, and the increasing commercializa­
tion of agriculture, which make cropping increas­
ingly attractive in the less drought-prone areas.
Policy Issues
Governments throughout the region have inter­
vened in various ways to help farmers and herders 
cope with drought. There are several compelling 
economic and humanitarian reasons why such 
interventions might be undertaken.
• The covariate nature of drought risk 
makes more efficient risk spreading diffi­
cult within agropastoral societies. All 
members suffer when drought occurs, and 
local sources of credit dry up just at a 
time when they are most needed. Also, 
livestock prices plummet during droughts 
when everybody is trying to sell (destock] 
and then rise rapidly afterward when 
everybody is trying to buy to rebuild their 
flocks (restock]. Credit and insurance 
markets for diffusing this covariate risk are 
weak in the rural areas of the MENA 
region. These problems, as well as the 
poor transportation and market infra­
structure for livestock products in the pas­
toral regions, are major obstacles to 
implementing more orderly destocking and 
restocking of rangelands as a solution to 
managing drought and preventing 
resource degradation.
• Property rights problems over the owner­
ship of cropland and rangeland may pre­
vent the spread of management practices
and investments that lead to more efficient 
drought management strategies. Without 
adequate property rights, population 
growth can lead to excessive stocking rates 
and to encroachment of cultivation into 
traditional rangeland areas. These changes 
in turn can induce degradation of range 
vegetation and soils and, by restricting the 
spatial mobility of flocks, increase herders' 
exposure to drought risk. Moreover, the 
inability to protect sown pastures, com­
munity-managed rangeland, private shrub 
plantations, and forests from wandering 
flocks shows that unrestricted grazing can 
also be damaging.
• Government has an obligation to alleviate 
human misery in drought years and to 
help protect the stock of breeding animals 
for the future.
• Herders and farmers may default on loans 
in drought years, causing difficult prob­
lems for lending institutions and reducing 
the average amount of credit available for 
agriculture.
• Overgrazing of pastures that are already 
drought stressed, and soil compaction in 
areas around water holes, may contribute 
to wind erosion and local climate change 
that have negative externality costs for a 
country.
Although there may be good reasons for govern­
ment intervention, policies need to be carefully 
designed if they are to provide assistance without 
jeopardizing the long-term efficiency and sustaina­
bility of the farming systems. Moreover, simply 
being able to fix an underlying problem is not suf­
ficient to ensure that action is economically worth­
while. It also needs to be shown that the problem 
can be fixed in ways that give a reasonable rate of 
return on public funds.
Where drought relief is required as a result of 
market failures [such as inappropriate property 
rights systems or a poorly developed financial 
market], it may be more cost-effective to fix the 
underlying problem [for example, reform property 
rights or strengthen rural financial markets] rather 
than to incur the repeated costs of drought relief. 
Similarly, public investment opportunities to reduce 
drought losses [such as by improving surface water 
capture and drilling more wells] may also be more
cost-effective over time than drought relief. Unfor­
tunately, these kinds of opportunities are typically 
quite limited in many drought-prone areas.
The cost of public drought management inter­
ventions is relatively easy to determine, but the 
benefits are much harder to assess. One-time inter­
ventions can provide significant humanitarian relief. 
But once drought management policies become 
institutionalized so that farmers and herders begin 
to take them for granted, they can lead to impor­
tant changes in farming practices that affect 
productivity.
Any good risk management aid should enable 
farmers and herders to take greater risks in their 
quest for higher average returns. If farmers are risk 
averse, then they trade off some level of expected 
income for lower risk [through, for example, risk 
diversification strategies]. The amount of expected 
income forgone to reduce risk can be viewed as a 
risk premium paid, or a production cost. If this 
cost can be reduced by the introduction of an 
improved risk management aid, then the farmer 
may be able to change strategy [specialize more in 
the most profitable activities, for instance] and 
obtain a higher average income for the same 
amount of risk. This change not only improves 
expected farm incomes, but can also lead to 
spillover benefits to consumers at an aggregate 
level through lower prices as the supply function 
shifts downward by the amount of the reduction in 
the risk premium per unit of output. This effect is 
similar to the effect of a new cost-reducing tech­
nology, and provided that the new risk manage­
ment aid is not subsidized, then there is always a 
net gain to society. But if the new risk management 
aid is subsidized, then the effect is similar to a sub­
sidy on any other farm input [such as fertilizer or 
credit]. The reduction in unit cost is partly paid for 
by the subsidy, and the cost of the subsidy is 
always greater than sum of the additional producer 
and consumer welfare that it generates [Siamwalla 
and Valdes 1986],
What does this mean in practice? It means that 
subsidized drought management interventions can 
reduce risk costs to farmers to below their true 
social value, leading to excessive risk taking and 
increased exposure to future drought losses. Not 
only is there a built-in dependence on future 
drought assistance from the government, but the 
net social return to the subsidy is negative. The
bottom line is that wherever possible, public inter­
ventions should be limited to drought management 
interventions that farmers pay for themselves, 
although it might be necessary for governments to 
devise arrangements that allow deferred payment in 
installments. Subsidies, when used, should be tar­
geted specifically to the poor who cannot other­
wise afford the drought protection they need and 
who control few resources so that any undesired 
distortions in resource allocation can be ignored.
Another potential problem with poorly designed 
drought management policies is that they can lead 
to moral hazard, a well-known problem in the 
insurance literature. Moral hazard refers to the 
incentive problems that arise when an insurer 
underwrites risks whose outcomes can be influ­
enced by the insured's behavior. For example, if an 
insurance company contracts to compensate a 
farmer for yield losses against pest and disease 
damage, then the farmer will have reduced incentive 
to be diligent in protecting or treating her crop 
once she realizes that the insurance will compensate 
for losses anyway. In the case of livestock insur­
ance, problems can arise because supposedly dead 
animals may "walk" elsewhere or their bodies may 
be sold for meat. Moral hazard leads to greater 
losses than necessary, increases the risk exposure 
of the insurer, and makes actuarial calculations of 
those risks almost impossible. Similar problems can 
arise if a government indiscriminately compensates 
for drought losses that could have been reduced or 
avoided by herders. Unless appropriately targeted, 
feed subsidy programs could, for example, lead to 
reduced incentive to exploit remaining grazing 
opportunities, particularly in more remote areas 
that require greater time and expense to reach. 
Debt forgiveness in drought years can also generate 
moral hazard problems. Once farmers know that 
their debt will be forgiven, they have increased 
incentive to borrow more than is prudent and 
reduced incentive to minimize their costs during 
droughts. Such behavior leads to greater losses 
than necessary and makes feed subsidies and credit 
programs more expensive than they need to be.
Governments throughout the MENA region have 
intervened to help manage drought losses, but 
usually on the basis of crisis relief once the 
drought has set in (interventions have included dis­
tribution of subsidized feeds for livestock, well 
drilling, and debt forgiveness]. Since the primary 
motive is typically humanitarian assistance, not
much thought has been given to the longer-term 
impacts of drought interventions on farming prac­
tices and productivity.
The result is often an inappropriate set of eco­
nomic signals to farmers and herders, leading to 
unsustainable farming practices in drought-prone 
areas that increase both future drought losses and 
farmers' dependence on government assistance, as 
well as to moral hazard problems that further add 
to the government's cost of providing drought 
compensation. A good analogy is the experience 
with hurricane disaster assistance in the United 
States. By routinely stepping in to compensate 
homeowners for their losses after a hurricane, the 
government encourages home construction in vul­
nerable coastal areas where prudent investors 
would not otherwise build and encourages fraudu­
lent practices within the home repair and construc­
tion industry. These problems add enormously to 
the cost of government assistance over time.
Stakeholders
The main stakeholders are the farmers and herders 
whose welfare is most at stake in drought years. 
But because drought interventions have longer- 
term impacts on the way resources are managed, 
they also generate environmental outcomes that are 
of concern to the populace in general and they 
affect meat and cereal prices, which are of concern 
to consumers. The interests of these different 
stakeholders are not always complementary, and 
trade-offs can arise. For example, consumers may 
prefer more abundant supplies of meat and cereals, 
but this desire may not be consistent with sustain­
able land and pasture management in the low-rain­
fall areas. On the other hand, farmers and herders 
will favor generous compensation in drought years, 
even though this approach may lead to excessive 
stocking rates and the further encroachment of 
barley planting into traditional grazing areas, 
neither of which is environmentally sustainable.
Policy Options
There are three possible sets of policy options for 
the future. The first is to continue with the present 
types of drought relief interventions but to find 
ways of making them less distorting. The second is 
to introduce some new policy instruments that are 
less costly and that do not distort incentives. The
third option is to withdraw all drought manage­
ment interventions, allow agricultural markets to 
work in an unfettered way, and put in place general 
safety net programs for the poor that are not tied 
to farming practices or outcomes. These policy 
options are outlined here.
Current Policy Instruments
Investments and policies to reduce drought losses. 
There are a number of investments that can reduce 
farmers' exposure to drought losses. These options 
include investing in physical structures and wells to 
increase irrigation and water supplies, contouring 
land or planting vegetative bunds to improve water 
capture in soils, and planting drought-resistant 
shrubs in grazing areas. These actions need not all 
be financed by government. In some cases, simply 
strengthening property rights over cropland or 
providing long-term credit may provide sufficient 
incentive for farmers to make their own private or 
group investments. Public investments in agri­
cultural research can also be targeted toward 
developing more drought-tolerant crop varieties 
and livestock breeds, thereby reducing yield losses 
in drought years. Improvements to rural roads can 
broaden the reach of local markets, helping to 
move livestock and feed over wider areas in the 
event of drought and buffering potential price fluc­
tuations. Most of these investments are win-win 
strategies that improve average farm productivity 
while also reducing exposure to drought losses.
Feed subsidies. Feed subsidy programs provide 
supplementary feeds to safeguard livestock, with 
the predominant expenditure going for subsidies 
toward the costs and distribution of concentrates 
and other feeds, especially barley. These programs 
have been quite successful in protecting livestock 
numbers and production during droughts. They 
have also had negative impacts, including the 
following:
• They have probably accelerated rangeland 
degradation in the long term by under­
mining the traditional process of adjusting 
flock size to interannual climatic variations. 
Herd sizes have increased sharply in recent 
years, and grazing practices have changed 
so that many of the animals no longer 
leave the rangeland areas during the dry 
season but have their feed and water 
trucked in. This practice leads to over- 
grazing during the dry season, reduces the
natural seeding of annual pasture species, 
disturbs the soil, and contributes to wind 
erosion, particularly in areas near water 
and feed supply points. User fees have 
been suggested as an economic signal of 
the scarcity and value of the rangelands, 
but whether this approach would be a via­
ble option in these large and often remote 
areas remains to be tested.
• Government procurement prices for bar­
ley have encouraged the mechanized 
encroachment of barley cultivation onto 
rangeland areas where it cannot be sus­
tained. An additional motive in some 
countries is that cultivation allows its per­
petrators to claim user rights to the land.
• Feed subsidies have added to the fiscal 
burden on governments.
• Subsidies tend to become permanent, and 
they have proved difficult to target, with 
the lion's share of the subsidized concen­
trates going to large herders and to com­
mercial farms.
Credit support Systematic rescheduling of credit 
for farmers during drought years has also been an 
important policy approach to drought management 
in the MENA region. Although this approach pro­
vides some short-term relief to herders and small 
farmers, it has proved of greatest benefit to larger 
farms and contributed to the chronically poor debt 
collection performance of the region's agricultural 
development banks. Perhaps a better approach 
would be to provide consumption credit, not tied 
to agricultural loans, to smooth consumption 
across years.
New Possibilities for Improved Drought 
Management
Rainfall insurance. Agricultural insurance has often 
appealed to policy makers as an instrument of 
choice for helping farmers and agricultural banks 
manage climate risks like drought, and indeed many 
billions of dollars of public money are spent each 
year on agricultural insurance around the world. 
But the experience has generally not been favorable 
[Hazell et al. 1986], Publicly provided crop insurance 
has without exception depended on massive subsi­
dies from government, and even then its per­
formance has been plagued by the moral hazard
problems associated with many sources of yield 
loss, by high administration costs, by political inter­
ference (especially compensation payments in elec­
tion years!), and by the difficulties of maintaining 
the managerial and financial integrity of the insurer 
when government underwrites all losses (Hazell 
1992). Livestock insurance that compensates for loss 
of animals or reduced productivity because of 
drought has rarely been offered, and seemingly not 
at all for herders in traditional pastoral systems. 
There are good reasons for this: the incidence of 
drought losses is usually too high to make the 
insurance affordable, opportunities for fraud and 
moral hazard are too great, and there is little 
opportunity for on-farm inspection of management 
practices or loss assessments, particularly when the 
animals are on the move.
But given the frequent occurrence of drought and 
the widespread damage it causes, there clearly is a 
need for some form of insurance against drought 
losses. Indeed, if such insurance could be success­
fully designed, it might well displace the need for 
many existing drought management policies.
What is needed is a form of insurance that is 
affordable, accessible to all kinds of people, com­
pensates for total income losses, is practical to 
implement given the limited kinds of data available, 
and can be provided by the private sector without 
the need for government subsidies.
Area-based rainfall insurance offers a promising 
new alternative that in principle can meet all these 
requirements listed above (Skees et al. 2000). In 
this approach, rainfall insurance contracts are writ­
ten against specific rainfall outcomes, like drought 
at a local weather station. The rainfall events should 
be defined at catastrophic levels, and they should 
be highly correlated with the value of regional agri­
cultural production or income. For example, an 
insured event might be that rainfall during the 
most critical month of the growing season falls 70 
percent below normal. In years when the insured 
event occurs, all the people who purchased the 
insurance would receive the same payment per unit 
of insurance. In all other years, no payments would 
be made.
Insurance would be sold in standard units (for 
example, $10 or $100), with a standard contract for 
each unit purchased called a standard unit contract 
(SUC). Purchasers would decide how many SUCs to
buy. The insurance would be sold on a full-cost 
basis, and the price of the SUC would be the 
premium. The insurance would need to be sold 
before season-specific information about the 
insured risk becomes available. Consequently a pur­
chasing deadline would be established (such as a 
month before the normal arrival of the rainy 
season), after which new SUCs would not be sold.
Area-based rainfall insurance has a number of 
attractive features:
• It avoids the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems that plague crop insur­
ance programs.
• It could be very inexpensive to administer.
• It uses only rainfall data, which are availa­
ble in most MENA countries for long 
periods of time.
• The insurance can be sold to anyone at 
risk when there is a drought, including 
agricultural traders and processors, farm 
input suppliers, banks, shopkeepers, and 
agricultural workers. There is no need to 
be a farmer or to keep livestock.
• It would be easy for the private sector to 
run.
• As long as the insurance is voluntary and 
unsubsidized, it will be purchased only 
when it is a less expensive or more 
effective alternative to existing risk man­
agement strategies.
• A secondary market for insurance certifi­
cates could emerge that would enable 
people to cash in the tradable value of a 
SUC at any time.
• By providing a way of insuring borrowing 
groups against covariate risks, it could help 
broaden the reach of microfinance pro­
grams to include more agricultural lending.
Any scheme for area-based rainfall insurance must 
overcome a number of difficulties:
• The insurer faces high risk because of the 
covariate nature of the insured risk. When 
a payment is due, then all those who have 
purchased insurance against the same 
weather station must be paid at the same
time. Moreover, if the insured risks at dif­
ferent rainfall stations are highly corre­
lated, then the insurer faces the possibility 
of having to make huge payments in the 
same year. To hedge against this risk, the 
insurer can either diversify regionally by 
selecting weather stations and risks that 
are not highly positively correlated or seek 
reinsurance in international financial 
markets.
• Rainfall stations must be protected to pre­
vent possible tampering of rainfall meas­
urements. Possible approaches include [1] 
more secure, tamper-proof stations and in­
struments, [2] triangulation of readings 
from neighboring weather stations, and [3] 
verification of low soil moisture by remote 
satellite sensing.
• The volume of insurance sold could be too 
small to be profitable. The insurance will 
only appeal to people whose economic 
losses are highly correlated with the 
insured rainfall event. If the basis risk [the 
uninsured part of a person's risk] is high, 
then the insurance will not sell. Also, if the 
probability of the insured risk is high, then 
the cost of the insurance could be prohibi­
tive. To overcome these problems, the 
insurance should be limited to truly catas­
trophic droughts that significantly affect 
agricultural production in a region.
• Global climate change and weather cycles 
[such as the Pacific El Nino Southern Os­
cillation [ENSO] weather patterns] can 
change the probability of the insured 
events, and insurers will be challenged to 
find cost-effective ways of adjusting the 
premium rates they charge to reflect 
changes in the underlying risk of loss.
The private sector has been slow to take the initia­
tive in developing rainfall insurance in developing 
countries, and several setup problems might 
require government intervention to jump-start 
activity. These interventions could include paying 
the research costs of identifying key catastrophic 
rainfall events that correlate strongly with agricul­
tural production and income; educating rural 
people about the value of rainfall insurance; ensur­
ing secure rainfall stations; establishing an appro­
priate legal and regulatory framework for rainfall
insurance; and underwriting the insurance in some 
way (perhaps through contingent loans] until a suf­
ficient volume of business has been established so 
that international reinsurers or banks are willing to 
come in and assume the underwriting role. These 
interventions need not be costly and could prove 
crucial in launching rainfall insurance. But it is also 
important not to launch the insurance on a subsi­
dized basis so as not to distort incentives for 
private insurers or farmers and herders. Drought 
insurance of the kind proposed here is being 
piloted in a number of developing countries with 
the active interest of international insurers [World 
Bank 2005],
Early warning drought forecasts. In principle, the 
ability to provide early warning drought forecasts 
could be a powerful tool for avoiding many of the 
economic costs associated with the misallocation of 
resources that arise because farmers, herders, and 
other decision makers must commit resources each 
year before key rainfall outcomes are known. For 
example, decisions about planting crops (such as 
date of planting, seeding rate, and initial fertilizer 
treatment] often have to be made at the beginning 
of the rainy season before knowledge about rainfall 
outcomes is available. The economic value of 
season-specific forecasts depends on the degree to 
which farmers can adjust their plans as the season's 
rainfall unfolds. Of course, the reliability of the 
forecasts and the ability of the farmers to adjust 
their initial decisions in response to this infor­
mation are also critical. If decisions about planting 
and cultivation practices and the feeding, culling, 
and seasonal movement of livestock can be 
sequenced, with key decisions being postponed 
until essential rainfall data are available, then fore­
cast information will be less valuable. But if most 
decisions must be made up front each season, then 
the scope for mistakes will be much larger and the 
potential economic gains from reliable forecast 
information will be greater. Stewart [1991] examines 
how the date of onset of the rainy season can pro­
vide a fairly reliable forecast of the ensuing seasonal 
rainfall pattern for Niamey, Niger, and shows how 
this information could be used to more optimally 
adjust planting and input decisions for the season 
(this is his “response" farming approach], Barbier 
and Hazell [2000] use a stochastic programming 
model to show how many of the decisions in a 
typical agropastoral community in Niger can be 
optimally adjusted to rainfall outcomes.
Reliable drought forecasts could also enable gov­
ernments and relief agencies to position themselves 
each year for more efficient and cost-effective 
drought interventions. This possibility has already 
been realized, and several early warning drought 
systems now in place in Africa have proved suc­
cessful in giving advance notice of emerging 
drought situations. But these programs are really 
monitoring systems that track emerging rainfall 
patterns within a season rather than true weather 
forecasting systems that predict rainfall outcomes 
before they even begin.
Reliable multiyear rainfall forecasts are not yet 
possible, but seasonal forecasts [from three to six 
months out) have become more reliable, particu­
larly where an important part of the year-to-year 
variation in seasonal rainfall can be attributed to 
the Pacific ENSO weather patterns. As the ability 
to model these phenomena at the global and 
regional level improves, it seems plausible to expect 
that more reliable seasonal forecasts will be available 
at local levels. Private weather forecasting services 
may expand and become more available to devel­
oping countries. But this is also an area where gov­
ernment could play a catalytic role, and even sub­
sidize many of the development costs, without 
having to worry that this involvement would 
distort resource management incentives at the farm 
level.
Nonagricultural Safety Nets
A very different policy approach is for govern­
ments to withdraw from providing any direct sup­
port to agriculture in drought years and to focus 
instead on providing efficient and well-targeted 
safety net programs that ensure that all needy 
people have adequate access to food and other 
essentials, including in drought years. This 
approach would be consistent with recent market 
liberalization programs in some MENA countries 
and their greater openness to food imports from 
abroad. It would, however, probably lead to a shift 
toward more extensive farming systems in the Iow- 
rainfall areas, with a reduced capacity to support 
the existing rural population in agriculture.
Assignment
Your assignment is to propose an appropriate mix
of drought management policies for the MENA
region, giving careful thought to the kinds of addi­
tional information needed to inform these choices.
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